Historians understand causal relationships from the point of view of multiple interrelated social, economic, and political factors, whereas climate scientists think in terms of environmental impacts on agriculture, warfare, demographics, and long-term stability. Those who study ancient climates have a range of tools at their disposal-proxy data deriving from such biological and geological climate archives as tree rings, stalagmites, and marine and continental sediment sequences. Historians can misconstrue or misuse these environmental data, generalizing from limited datasets or misappropriating low-resolution data: Insensitivity to both limitations in data and limitations in interpretation are pitfalls for everyone.
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By contrast, the higher-resolution evidence deployed by historians and archaeologists, though sometimes facilitating detailed narrative accounts of events or indirectly reºecting adjustments in economic activity, the nature of warfare, or the quality and quantity of harvests and crops, can nevertheless suffer from a considerable degree of uncertainty and subjectivity. In some cases, scholars have only recently begun to study the data sources-such as the archaeobotanical evidence and the stable-isotope records from archaeological materials-that are relevant to a particular climate. Apart from the methodological issues involved and the difªculties associated with reconciling qualitative with quantitative data, the best way around these problems is for the different specialists to work together with a common project in mind.
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Until recently, archaeologists who investigate the earliest human societies have tended to be far more familiar with these matters than have those who study historical periods with written records. Current debates about a major period of aridity in the Mediterranean between c. 2300 and 2000 b.c.e. (the so-called 4.2 ka event), for example, depend largely upon archaeological data to infer societal adaptations to drought (although the phenomenon appears also to be evident in a range of palaeoclimatic records). They are usually based on a different approach to the subject than historians normally adopt. Questions of chronological resolution and scale remain a major challenge for prehistoric studies (though increasingly reªned, as shown by the 4.2 ka event), but the techniques developed in ªelds outside the traditional scope of historians can offer new insights about the Roman and medieval worlds.
6
Historians of more recent periods, especially those who focus on cultural or socio-economic history, are often resistant to thinking about climate as a causal element. This reluctance frequently carries the (not always unreasonable) excuse that such explanations de Lyon, 5-8 décembre 2005 (Istanbul, 2007 ; S. E. van der Leeuw, "What Is an "Environmental Crisis" to an Archaeologist? The Archaeology of Environmental Change," in C. Fisher, B. Hill, and G. Feinman (eds.) , Socio-Natural Legacies of Degradation and Resilience (Tucson, 2009), 40-61. reduce human history to climate history, thus ignoring both social complexity and multi-causality, but it just as frequently reºects a disinclination to deal with the bewildering complexity of scientiªc evidence and methodologies. What is more, due to differences in the quantity and scope of the available evidence, climate study of the late-antique and medieval Middle East is considerably different from that of early modern Europe. Although valuable written evidence is available, in many cases it is insufªcient to infer speciªc reactions to the extreme weather events associated with climate ºuctuations. Wherever there is also a lack of high-quality palaeoclimatic data, attempts to establish ªrm links between climate and society become complicated.
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The interest of historians and archaeologists in merging palaeoclimatic data with traditional historical sources has been growing since the 1980s, when the now-classic volume edited by Rotberg and Rabb appeared. Virtually every period and region has been drawn into the discussion, and a number of individual studies, as well as larger projects, have brought specialists from different ªelds and disciplines together with a view toward analyzing particular pre-modern historical periods in speciªc regions of the world. Orient, XLVI (2003), 3-45. climate/environment and the Empire's ascendance, thereby raising a series of broader questions about the causal connections between political and social-cultural evolution and climate. In Rome's case, they have demonstrated a distinct parallel between a period of stable climatic conditions and the Empire's rise and consolidation, and between a subsequent period of climatic instability-the prevalence of highly variable climatic conditions on a decadal scaleand the breakdown of the imperial economy and the state that it supported. Although the climatic effects are distinct regionallybetween the eastern and western parts of the Empire and among sub-regions-the precise nature of the causal relationships between environmental, political, social-economic, and cultural developments remains to be elucidated. Historians of the Byzantine world have followed suit, although they have a great deal more work to do.
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Historians of eastern Roman (Byzantine) Anatolia must grapple with a limited written record and rely on as wide a range of sources as possible; archaeology and environmental sciences are (Budapest, 2003), 247-261. key. The integration of three types of archive offers signiªcant advantages. The subject invites interdisciplinary cooperation, as well as the construction of relatively general models of climate/ environment/society interaction. It is precisely the bringing of climate and environment into the existing models of social, economic, and political change in Byzantine Anatolia that promises to expand our understanding of this historical society.
Historians are just as likely to reject arguments based on climate and environment on reductionist grounds as they are to misunderstand them and misuse their underlying data. They also need to be careful with, and critical about, temporal resolution-for example, high-resolution data capable of annual to decadal association versus centennial data, which is much less causally speciªc. Issues of scale can easily confuse or lead to misunderstandings. What a climate scientist might see as a "crisis" lasting a mere century, a historian might regard as a long period of change and social, political, and economic transformation. Different disciplines have different styles: Scientists seek to reduce causality to simple terms, such as temporal coincidence or statistical correlation, whereas historians deal with complex processes and are wary of oversimpliªcation.
Neither climate scientists, historians, nor archaeologists are in a position by themselves fully to integrate the vast range of data necessary for a multicausal analysis that explains rather than simply describes. More local and regional studies are needed to test methodologies, collect multidisciplinary data, and ultimately derive holistic interpretations. This article can be understood in the context of Past Global Changes (pages) focus 4 project (http://www .pages-igbp.org/science/foci/focus-4), "Past Human-ClimateEcosystem Interactions," rightly arguing that this interrelationship becomes clear through a comparison of regional-scale reconstructions of environmental and climatic processes with evidence of past human activity. Our study also links to ihope (The Integrated History and Future of People on Earth).
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climate and the wider perspective Human activity has arguably had a greater imprint on the landscape than any other single factor, particularly with respect to the way in which deforestation and over-grazing have led to soil exhaustion, erosion, alluviation, 120 | JOHN HALDON ET AL. and land abandonment. But outside factors have also affected human exploitation of the landscape. Because relatively minor shifts in climate can have signiªcant effects at a local to regional level, it will be worth reviewing what we know of the climate history of the region from late antiquity into the medieval period before looking at the possible signiªcance of such factors for some important changes in social, economic, and political history.
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Palaeoclimatic records indicate that the conditions prevailing across western Eurasia from the third to the second century b.c.e. into the late second century c.e. remained relatively warm and humid, conducive to intensive agriculture. Often referred to as the "Roman Warm Period" (rwp), it was typiªed by conditions that minimized much of the usual risk and decadal variability associated with Mediterranean climate, coinciding with the growth and consolidation of Roman military and political power and economic expansion. By the same token, such conditions were also particularly favorable to the advance of agriculture and the increase in population across central and northern Europe. A detailed examination, however, shows signiªcant climatic variations both in time and in space during this period; the rwp was not warm and wet everywhere all the time. Just as the Medieval Warm Period is now more commonly referred to as the Medieval Climate Anomaly (mca), it is likely that the rwp should similarly be re-evaluated.
A correlation has been postulated between climate and changing solar activity, with periods of low solar activity-solar minima-commonly found in conjunction with low temperatures. Accordingly, scholars have associated climate and solar activity with historical events or developments, although this relationship is never one-to-one, and its existence is often hotly debated.
12
Notwithstanding the absence of consensus, climate historians largely agree about the long-term (multicentennial to millennial scale) changes that have affected the earth. What is usually less clear from the historical perspective are the decadal-scale climatic ºuc-tuations that are superimposed on long-term changes in mean climate, because they are affected by a range of factors that in many cases still need to be fully investigated and understood.
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The broad picture for the Roman world shows favorable and stable climatic conditions from c. 250 b.c.e. to 200 c.e., giving way thereafter to a far more variable climate, with higher-amplitude ºuctuations between cold/dry and warm/wet periods. In central and western Anatolia, climatic variations appear to have been well distinguished, with some signiªcant wet-to-dry oscillations. In the southern Levant, the climate may have become more humid after c. 400 c.e. until sometime in the sixth century, when drier weather prevailed, although the chronology of such changes remains insecure.
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The exact timing and duration of the subregional variations are yet to be clariªed due to the imprecisely dated palaeoclimatic data, but the evidence suggests that the pattern of change may not have been the same everywhere-for example, in western Anatolia and the southern Levant. Given the paucity of proxy records for temperature in the eastern Mediterranean within this time interval, we must resort to an analysis of tree rings and speleothems (stalagmites, stalactites, and ºowstones) from the Alps and central Europe. They indicate that the climate became much colder during the ªrst 122 | JOHN HALDON ET AL.
half of the sixth century (Figure 1 ). For the period from the 530s, conditions may have been affected by what appears to have been a large volcanic eruption dated roughly between 536 and 541, although there is no strong evidence to link it with events in the northern hemisphere. The plague of Justinian broke out in 541, but the nature of a possible connection between a changing climate and this pandemic over subsequent years remains unelucidated.
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During the second half of the sixth century and into the ªrst half of the seventh, conditions were cold in central Europe, allowing glacial advance in the Alps. Alpine glacier evidence suggests warming c. 400 and some very slow glacial advance c. 430, although the ªfth-century tree-ring data indicate conditions that are neither especially cool nor warm; speleothem evidence from Austria shows cooling c. 400 to 450, followed by warming again. In the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean, broadly, the period from the second to the ªfth century may have become increasingly arid, although the evidence is not always easy to interpret, and opinions differ. Most observers agree, however, about a shift to a wetter (and possibly warmer) regime during the ªfth and into the sixth century. In the southern Levant, this wetter phase seems to end in the course of the ªrst half of the sixth century; in central and western Anatolia more humid conditions appear to have persisted into the eighth century. Some historians have wondered whether this weather has causal implications regarding the revival and consolidation of the Eastern Roman Empire at this time. The evidence of ceramics and other data would certainly support an intensiªcation of economic activity at that time in that region. McCormick et al., "Climate Change, [198] [199] For a discussion of the data for the northern European situation, see McCormick et al., "Climate Change, [191] [192] [193] [194] [195] . Note again the emphasis on regional variation, a reºection of the uncertain chronology currently derived from the data. The key proxy climate records shown in Figure 1 pertain mainly to central and western Anatolia, which after the middle of the seventh century lay at the heart of the Byzantine Empire (see Figure 2b ). The relatively well-dated stable-isotope records from Sofular Cave, reºective of the Black Sea environment, and Nar Lake, in a more continental location, both show closely aligned trends throughout the period from 270 to 1450 c.e. They indicate drier climatic conditions during the later fourth and early ªfth centuries; greater humidity during the later sixth, seventh, and early eighth centuries; and a shorter-lived dry phase afterward. The same pattern is recorded in the less detailed and not so well-dated sedimentary record from Tecer Lake (See Figure 1) . To what extent are these climatic trends registered in historical records of weather and crisis for the same time period? Telelis compiled systematic surveys of extreme weather conditions and their effects from Byzantine archival sources for the period from 300 to 1500 c.e., and Stathakopoulos cataloged episodes of famine and disease from 284 to 750 c.e. These conditions, covering the eastern Mediterranean as a whole, are listed in Appendix 1 and shown summarily in Figure 1 . In contrast to most proxy climate records, historical observations are neither continuous nor complete; events may be missing from the documentary record. Furthermore, it may not always be possible to locate events with geographical precision, though the ones that are relatively easy to place can provide clear causal connections. For example, according to Stathakopoulos, between 451 and 454 c.e., "as a result of a drought in Phrygia, Galatia, Cappadocia, Cilicia and Palestine, a famine occurred . . . and a pestilence broke out." But causality is not always so obvious. For instance, the reasons for the lack of wheat and barley that led to the shortage of bread in Constantinople in 555 c.e. are unclear; this might have been the result of provisioning problems in Egypt.
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Given these potential difªculties, it is all the more striking that proxy data and historical records show such a close overall correspondence for western and central Anatolia for the period between 300 and 870 c.e. (Figure 1 ). During the drier climatic phase from 300 to 560 c.e., twelve droughts and eighteen famines are recorded, and during the subsequent wet phase from 560 to 730 c.e., no droughts and only two famines are noted in the historical record. After 730 c.e., droughts and famines again became more frequent, this time accompanied by severe winter weather (cold and snow), especially in the ninth and subsequent centuries.
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The good correspondence between the proxy and historical , "Geodatabase, " nos. 545, 553, 595, 604, 625, 651, 692, 698, 718 (Syria) ; 678 (Crete); 642-643 (Thessaloniki). data sets breaks down for the late tenth and eleventh centuries; no hint of documented droughts is evident in any of the proxy-climate records. The reasons for this divergence are not entirely clear, but notably only one of the historically recorded droughts (in 1037 c.e.) is located in Anatolia; many more occurred in Greece and Macedonia to the west. The absence of reports cannot be attributed to the Byzantines' loss of central and eastern Anatolia to the Turks, because this loss did not occur until the battle of Manzikert in 1071, and Anatolia provided numerous weather reports (mainly of cold winters) prior to this date. Hence, although certain parts of the eastern Mediterranean undoubtedly experienced harsh weather conditions during the tenth and eleventh centuries, drought conditions do not appear to have affected all parts of the region.
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After the second century c.e., a series of changes in regional climate patterns continued across the ªfth and sixth centuries, and well into the seventh century, marking the end of the relative stability of the rwp; the impacts varied by north and south and by east and west, as well as by time. In central Anatolia, for example, the early ªfth century was markedly dry, followed by the rapid onset of much wetter climatic conditions during the course of the sixth century ( Figure 1 ). To what extent the different historical trajectories of east and west can be tied to these different climatic trends remains to be seen, although some distinct causal connections have been posited. The current state of our knowledge of these changes across several centuries is still sketchy, given both the absence of data from many areas and inadequate chronological control within some datasets, leaving a good deal of the dating uncertain. Despite the incompleteness of the regional pattern beneath the general trends, approximate parallels between climatic history and the evolution of states and societies suggest that climate and environment should ªgure prominently in an integrated interpretation of past events.
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the case for anatolia Byzantine Anatolia is a ªtting locus for a multidisciplinary study because it is has three vital types of data in abundance-written, archaeological, and palaeoenvironmental (see Table 1 ). Other candidates, like the ancient Maya lowlands, are weak in the written component or, like early modern and modern Europe, are already well documented in both historical and paleoclimatic records. Anatolia's historical data allows us to test such critical causal propositions as "drought causes societal collapse," which would be difªcult to falsify in a setting without documentary evidence-say, the end of the Early Bronze Age in the Middle East. Nor does it hurt that Anatolia is currently a major focus of attention with regard to climate change.
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Following a workshop at Princeton University in May 2013, a small group of climate and environmental scientists, historians, and archaeologists established a project to examine Anatolia and adjacent lands between the second/third century and the thirteenth/ fourteenth century c.e.-the period that saw the "decline and fall" of the Roman Empire in the west, the survival of the Byzantine Empire (something of a misnomer but a well-established one) in the east, the rise of the Arab-Islamic Empire in the eastern provinces of the late Roman state during the seventh century c.e., the appearance of Turkic peoples ªrst in Iran and then the Middle East from the later tenth and eleventh centuries c.e. and their occupation of the Anatolian plateau, and the rise of Ottoman power (see Appendix 2 for a selective list of historical events). This article deals primarily with the early part of the period.
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Environmentally, Anatolia and the southern Balkans are subject to three large-scale circulation systems that affect the region at different times of the year-the North Atlantic system, the South Asian summer monsoonal system, and the continental winter climate system, anchored over northern Asia, western Russia, and Si- precipitation during the recent period of instrumental measurements. Such coherence is also likely to have been the case during the last two millennia (although, interestingly, the southern Levant has shown an opposite pattern). The fact that this same area broadly coincides with the extent of Byzantine Anatolia between c. 660 c.e. and 1071 c.e. permits us to map the two directly onto each other (Figure 2b ).
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Anatolia supports a substantial microregional differentiation in climate, land use and demographic history; the relationship between historically attested extreme weather events, longer-term climate change, and socio-economic organization there presents singular opportunities and challenges. Since the Roman, early medieval European, and early and middle Byzantine era, unlike more recent historical periods, has no continuous written records, the uncertainties accompanying the integration of historical, archaeologi- cal, climatic data abound. Yet, thanks to the introduction of new approaches and new sources, the study of Anatolia promises to expand and deepen our understanding of how society functioned, particularly when environmental changes stressed that society. The whole is considerably greater in this respect than the sum of the parts in such a project: The interaction of climate scientists and palaeoenvironmentalists with historians and archaeologists promotes a much better understanding of the methodological problems that specialists encounter, as well as a more coherent and synthetically persuasive integrated interpretation of the various datasets that they deliver to each other. The debate about the end date for the bop is explicable only partially by the imprecision of the chronologies derived from the various data sets. In certain sites with well-deªned timescales, the end is dated to the middle or later seventh century c.e., whereas in others, its termination is earlier, sometimes considerably so. The pollen at the sites of Lakes Beyqehir and Hoyran suggest a date in the middle years of the sixth century (see Figure 3 and Table 2 ). Those at Lake Bafa on the Aegean Coast and the one at Köycegiz BYZANTINE CLIMATE | 133 Table 2 for Site Numbers and Names) C dates offered by older pollen studies derived from bulk organic matter rather than ams dating, which can be applied to much smaller samples (for example, single charred cereal grains) and achieve smaller statistical age uncertainty. Hence, dating of the bop's end in most of these older records has a precision of no better than Ϯ200 years. What is clear is that almost all of the records show a sharp decline in anthropogenic indicators and a rise in pine pollen at some point during the middle of the ªrst millennium c.e., indicating a decline in rural agriculture and a re-wilding of many landscapes.
Although anthropogenic factors probably played a major role in the appearance of the bop, a beneªcial climate régime must have had something to do with it; thus, the relationship between human and climatic factors still needs to be addressed. Although the appearance of the bop coincides with the rise of the ªrst major state formations in several areas, the climatic "tipping points" for substantive change clearly varied. The economic and social-political developments that accompanied the end of the bop comprise only part of the many complex changes that Byzantium-in particular, its Anatolian territories-underwent from c. 400 to 1400 c.e.
How we understand the Byzantine response to the crisis of the later seventh and early eighth centuries depends on the palaeoclimatic work discussed above. It reveals that much, but not all, of Anatolia experienced a wetter climate from the sixth to the later seventh century, possibly stretching into the early eighth century in some areas, although the end of this humid phase varies by site: at Nar Gölü in central Cappadocia (known by the tenth century as "lesser Cappadocia)" and at Çöl Gölü near Çankìrì (Gaggra) to the east of Ankara-typical of the central sections of the plateauc. 750; at Tecer Gölü in northwestern Cappadocia the later eighth century; and at Gravgaz marsh in southwestern Anatolia the middle of the seventh century. world. Given its raised central plateau, and marked variations in elevation, the cooling associated with reduced solar activity (major solar minimum in the seventh century c.e.) would have had varying effects. These effects would have been most pronounced in the most elevated areas with longer snow-covered winters, reduced growing seasons, and generally less favorable circumstances for certain crops and types of farming. But, notwithstanding the limited nature of the data, this general climatic pattern seems to have been replicated, with minor variations, across Anatolia. Indeed, the available textual evidence from the wider eastern Mediterranean and Levantine context hints at the instability that these climatic conditions promoted-a comparatively greater number of severe winters and apparently unusually severe frosts and snows across the later sixth and into the eighth century in the Levant and Asia Minor, as well as occasional droughts and aridity-related events. A recent analysis of Arabic written sources from Baghdad (Iraq) for the period 830 c.e. to the early eleventh century, for example, found a preponderance of cold-winter anomalies for the ªrst part of the tenth century.
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gathering the data A close look at palynological data from a series of sites across the western half of Anatolia is highly informative. Pollen from ºora representing both human activities (from cereals and nut trees, for example, or the weeds and grasses favored for grazing livestock) and the natural vegetation that replaces crops or expands to occupy formerly tilled land are suggestive of particular agricultural patterns. A ªrst conclusion is that Anatolia's arable and pastoral land, even the marginal areas, was, with regional variations according to local conditions, put to relatively intensive use during the sixth and seventh centuries. Both the palynological record and the archaeological evidence indicate that much of the region was densely inhabited and characterized by mixed farming.
Beginning in the seventh century, however, this intensive and relatively homogenous exploitation of land receded, at different rates, across the southern Balkans and much of Asia Minor with the entire bop agricultural régime. In its place, many locations underwent a sequence of progressive expansion of natural vegetationincreasingly prominent indications of post-arable growth, followed by scrub, and either wild grasses and steppic vegetation or woodland re-growth. Other locations show evidence of continued anthropogenic land use but with a much more limited range of crops that varied according to speciªc local conditions. Cereal production and livestock raising began to dominate, and the cultivation of vines and olives to decrease dramatically in many areas.
Palynological investigation shows considerably less pollen from fruit trees of all types for this period. Parts of inland Bithynia in northwest Anatolia, close to Constantinople, however, appear to defy this trend to some extent, showing signs that the bop suite of cultivars continued unbroken, albeit with an overall reduction in the volume of production. By contrast, the evidence suggests that the coastal regions of Bithynia increased their reliance on pastoral farming at the expense of cereal and fruit production, possibly testifying to the frequent sea-borne attacks there during the second half of the seventh and early eighth centuries, which made such cultivation risky. The survival of traditional agriculture in inland areas, away from the threatened coastal areas, may reºect market demand from Constantinople.
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As a whole, Anatolia in this period evinces a much simpliªed agro-pastoral regime and a reduced level of activity. The wholesale retreat from many of the marginal areas that had formerly been farmed and the often dramatic reduction in farming elsewhere might be indicative of a reduced rural population in some areas as well-certainly in the Konya plain region, where a hitherto dense settlement relying on extensive seasonal irrigation vanished in the later seventh/early eighth century. A similar pattern is evident in the material remains at Çadìr Höyük (in the basin of the Kanak Su, Yozgat province), where the wealthy settlement of the late antique period was replaced by a smaller habitation. Although the dates are still difªcult to assess, these changes appear to have been roughly contemporary with those in the broader region. Similar developments appear to have occurred in Cappadocia, Bithynia, and eastern Paphlagonia. Although the evidence for these developments is patchy, and many more sample sites are necessary to ensure comprehensive coverage (particularly in the lowland sites where many cities were located), the overall picture appears to ªt well with the textual and the archaeological evidence about the collapse of established urban and agricultural customs, the downward demographic trend, and the general militarization of the Empire's provincial society.
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In some regions, after 100 to 250 years, a further shift is evident in the pollen, indicating greater entrenchment of this simpliªed regime; an expansion of large-scale pastoral farming; and a reappearance, in some contexts, of cultivars, mainly cereals, but also traces of vines, olives, and fruits. This slight return coincides with the political and economic recovery of the Empire during the later ninth and tenth centuries, as well as with the end of a drier (and cooler) period that had lasted from the eighth into the tenth century (see Figure 4) .
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By way of illustration, the palynological data from Nar Gölü-which included the Roman and Byzantine center of Nazianzos, laying just to the north of the current Melendiz Ovasï (Bishop's Meadow)-indicates a signiªcant agrarian recovery during the second half of the tenth century c.e., presenting a new conªguration in the region's rural economy. The area now placed greater emphasis on cereal production and livestock herding, as opposed to the orchards and gardens of the bop before its abrupt termination in the region between, roughly, 670 and 690. For a detailed account of the overall picture, see Leslie Brubaker and Haldon, Byzantium in the Iconoclast Period : A History (New York, 2011), 531-563; Haldon, "'Cappadocia Will Be Given Over to Ruin and Become a Desert, '" 215-230. In the 960s, just to the south of Nar Gölü, was a productive and wealthy imperial estate (called Drizion in the Byzantine sources). Contemporary sources imply that it had only recently become safe from hostile attack, after years of warfare and conºict. It may well be the activities of such imperial estates, in expanding or re-establishing cereal production, among other crops, that the pollen data for the period from 950 onward reºect. But we also know that a number of Anatolian aristocratic landlords began to invest in expanding their estates around this time, coinciding with the height of imperial political and military power and expansion and widespread growth of the agrarian economy in the Byzantine world. Was the degree of this improvement in the economic, political, and military fortunes of the Empire-more speciªcally, its BYZANTINE CLIMATE | 141 social elite in Asia Minor-aided by an amelioration in the climate regime?
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A persuasive universal explanation for these developments is still elusive. Most, but not all, of the shifts inferred from the palaeoecological record can be demonstrated to coincide neatly with known political events, such as the Arab-Islamic invasions from the late seventh century. Moreover, not all of the "climate change" events ªt perfectly with other types of events. The substantial regional variation across Anatolia (as indicated by the palaeoclimatic data), which we have already discussed, is rarely given sufªcient at-142 | JOHN HALDON ET AL. Figure 2a ). Anatolia's apparent climatic instability suggests that environmental shifts may have contributed signiªcantly to changes in the vegetation reºected in the pollen data from the ªfth and sixth centuries into the seventh and eighth centuries. But because many pollen deposits, as well as climatic changes, are amenable to only approximate dating, their exact relationship remains obscure at most sites.
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As already noted, in some areas, such as around Lake Beyqehir on the western edge of the plateau, or around Sagalassos in Pisidia, the change in vegetation patterns occurred across the period from the ªrst half of the sixth century into the mid-seventh century, but with a high level of local variation within a small area. At the coastal sites in Lycia, in the Bereket Valley south of Sagalassos, and on the southern Aegean littoral, the end of the bop appears even earlier; in Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Pontus, the seventh century marks the key transition, although the traditional suite of cultivars may have survived into the eighth century in certain localities. In parts of Cappadocia, however, the 670s certainly denote an end to bop-type agriculture but not any clearly identiªable shift in climate. At Lake Nar, some 30 km south-west of Derinkuyu, the bop ended precipitously within the period 664 to 678 c.e., dateable by annually laminated high-resolution sediments from the lake. Here a decided increase in tree pollen and a decrease in anthropogenic indicators (for example, Olea, cereal pollen types) is noticeable, and analysis of the pollen concentrations indicates a substantial, and abrupt, increase in tree cover and/or density. A sustained increase in pine-pollen percentages is typical of many other western Anatolian pollen diagrams that record the end of the bop, by all accounts signifying an expansion of pine forests across the Taurus and Pontic mountain chains, though probably at some distance from Nar. The sustained increase in deciduous oak pollen, however, most likely reºects expanding oak woodland areas and/or an increase in tree density more locally within Cappadocia.
37
Signiªcantly, pollen percentages for grasses associated with steppe vegetation also declined in this period, possibly implying that woody vegetation began to cover some of the areas previously dedicated to livestock grazing. At Nar Lake highly resolved palaeoclimatic data show a distinct change in conditions-from humid to more arid-but only from c. 750. Importantly, the pollen and the independent climate proxies, such as oxygen isotopes, come from the same sediment cores, thus precluding the possibility of miscorrelation. In this particular example, it has been possible to demonstrate a reasonably persuasive association between anthropogenic activity-intensive Arab raiding that devastated the landscape during the years in question-and the picture derived from the environmental data. No simple correlation exists between societal collapse and any adverse climatic changes in the Nar Lake record during the seventh and eighth centuries. The re-occupation of Cappadocia between 850 and 950 c.e., however, coincided with an amelioration of the climate toward wetter conditions, suggesting that an increasingly propitious agro-climatic environment may
have encouraged the re-establishment of the middle Byzantine rural economy. So far, however, Nar Lake presents the only case study in which this degree of cross-disciplinary interpretation has been possible (see Table 3 ).
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Archaeological site surveys provide an alternative data set for changes in rural population. A number of the recent ªeld surveys in Anatolia have begun to yield settlement data within systematic sampling programs. The majority of them are multi-period ªeld programs, though the Sagalassos regional survey in Pisidia, for one, was initially prompted by interest in a particular archaeological period-the Hellenistic-Roman-Byzantine. Identiªcation of siteoccupation periods is primarily based on analysis of potsherds collected in the ªeld, the typology of which allows attribution to broad archaeological phases lasting several centuries (for instance, the late Roman). Periods of site abandonment, which are represented by the absence of evidence, are, by deªnition, harder to deªne and identify. gional Archaeological Surveys. The Sinop survey demonstrates a remarkable rise in settlement density from the fourth century along the east-facing coast to the south of the main port. This coast was known in antiquity as the most favorable along the Black Sea for the production of olives. Strabo, the ªrst-century b.c.e. geographer, who was a native of the region and almost certainly an eyewitness, described it as thickly planted with olive groves. Furthermore, olive pits have been recovered from locally produced late Roman amphorae raised from the Sinop harbor area. Environmental evidence is still under analysis, but there is a dramatic drop in settlement density in the Demirci valley, 15 km south of Sinop, from forty-ªve recorded archaeological sites to a mere eight Middle-Late Byzantine sites; and in the Kirkgeçitcayì valley, from forty-six Late Roman sites to just four Middle-Late Byzantine sites. Based on the datable material ªnds, this decrease in the number of identiªable settlements appears to correspond with the seventh century, consistent with the cool/wet climatic conditions associated with the end of the bop.
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A crop like olives, always marginal in the Black Sea, would be highly sensitive to this climatic shift. The radical reduction in rural settlement in the Sinop hinterland could be explained by the collapse of a near-monopoly on olive exports in the Black Sea linked to climate "deterioration." Olive cultivation would also have been sensitive to temperature conditions, especially in spring, and the severe winters that became increasingly common from the sixth century onward (see Appendix 1) made olive trees at or above 1,000 masl (meters above sea level) increasingly vulnerable to frost damage. A postclassical decline in olive cultivation is evident both archaeologically and in pollen diagrams (see Figure 5 ), at least in part due to climatic adversity.
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A similar case involving the potential inºuence of climate on the economic history of the countryside is manifest in the results of the archaeological survey around the classical city of Balboura in northern Lycia (southwestern Anatolia), almost all of its territory above 1,200 masl. As in the Sinop region, the rural settlement of the main Roman period continued into late antiquity. The total number of potsherds from this remote highland area rose in the ªfth century, reaching a peak two centuries later, just when the economic system of the Eastern Roman Empire was failing. Yet after another 100 years, the entire area seems to have been abandoned; no substantial ceramic ªnds date later than the eighth century c.e. (see Figure 5) . Interestingly, even for this ªnal century, there is enough evidence to suggest that the city of Balboura had continuous access to the wider networks of commercial exchange, creating no impression of gradual economic decline.
Although the depopulation of the area cannot be easily linked to any speciªcally identiªable political or military factor, location, with respect to both climatic and strategic circumstances, appears to have been the key to its eighth-century abandonment. As the micro-climate of this highland became drier and colder during the course of the eighth century, agriculture in such a relatively marginal area became impractical and cost-ineffective, especially with such crops as olive trees and vines, which are sensitive to spring frost. Such a marginal agrarian economy was also highly vulnerable to the sort of disruption that hostile military activity caused, even if only occasionally. Given the many other more attractive territories in southwestern Anatolia that had become underpopulated by this time as a result of warfare and other calamities, researchers surmise, plausibly enough, that the population simply migrated to more favorable districts.
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The combined pollen and stable-isotope record from Gölhisar Gölü-near the classical city of Kibyra, which lies adjacent to Balboura, but at a slightly lower elevation (930 masl)-lacks the detailed sampling resolution and precise dating control of the Nar Lake record; only long-term (multicentennial) trends can be rec- ognized in it (see Figure 5 ). It is a perfect example of the limitations inherent in low-resolution data regarding the kind of shorter-term events or extremes that the Nar data are able to capture. Nevertheless, by using a multi-proxy approach from the same core sequence, it can be demonstrated that because the onset of drier and probably colder climatic conditions did not begin before the end of the bop (dated in this case to sometime between 600 and 735 c.e.), it cannot have caused the end of the bop. The trend toward a drier climate between c. 660 and c. 960 c.e. is likely, however, to have deterred Balboura's population from continuing its commitment to a place with an increasingly marginal agrarian economy, and although location was a key factor, the additional threat of Arab invasion may have been an added disincentive. The local community might have persisted if faced with only one of these dangers, but the resilience of Balboura and other upland cities would have been severely tested with both of them in place. The pollen evidence in Balboura, unlike that in Cappadocia, shows that this area of southwest Anatolia did not see a return to crop production in medieval times, in spite of archaeological evidence for re-occupation. The new economy was likely based on nomadic pastoralism rather than year-round settlement; crops such as olive trees played no part in it.
All of the pollen and archaeological data collected thus far indicate a degree of interregional variation, suggesting that the end of the established patterns of land use depended on speciªc local factors. When placed in the broader context of the eastern Mediterranean basin, we might suspect that the plague of Justinian also played a demographic role, however randomly differential its impact was according to area, population, and settlement density or such natural environmental factors as the dust-veil event of the late 530s. The cooler and less stable climatic conditions in Anatolia after the sixth century c.e. must have rendered some agricultural activities more marginal than before, possibly accounting for the development of a less vulnerable, simpler, and safer mode of agrarian economy. The regionally speciªc suite of cultivars and agrarian activities characteristic of the period until the sixth and early seventh centuries managed to survive in some areas-parts of Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and the central plateau-into the eighth century, notwithstanding changes in climatic conditions. In other areas, changes that are evident in the palynological data appear to have occurred at times when no evidence for a shift in the prevailing climate is available; we may make the hardly remarkable assumption that human agency was responsible. The intervention of human agents on the environment in response to a range of social and economic pressures or stimuli-market demand, political conditions, ªscal demands, and so forth-is commonplace.
In the case of the seventh-century eastern Roman world, important and largely overlooked historical data suggest that farmers reacted to perceived environmental changes by introducing new crops and that the state reacted to the loss of the eastern provinces and the serious threat posed by the Arab-Islamic attacks by instituting a new tax policy, by organizing the military, and by controlling resources. We surmise that the adverse environmental conditions of this period contributed, at least in part, to the persistence, rather than the demise, of a political system-a point deserving of its own detailed argument elsewhere.
This article compares and synthesizes evidence from multiple disciplinary traditions-the documentary sources of historians, the material culture of archaeologists, the pollen of palynologists, and the stalagmite chemistry of earth scientists. We have focused on western and central Anatolia during the millennium-long transition from the classical to the medieval world. Maintaining spatial congruence ensures a working scale on which climatic and societal changes were broadly homogenous, permitting analysis of the complex causal relationships between human activity, environmental change, and the transformation of social, economic, and political structures. Any attempt to examine the Eastern Roman Empire as a whole would amalgamate regions with distinct environmental histories (for instance, Egypt vs. Anatolia). Wider geo-graphical linkages certainly exist, both societal and environmental, but they are less likely to map onto each other.
Late classical to medieval Anatolia offers a particularly interesting regional "laboratory" for studying the effect of climate on society, as well as the effect of human activity on the environment. At the very least, the Anatolian case challenges a number of longstanding assumptions about such causal connections, particularly with regard to how environmental conditions during the later seventh and eighth centuries c.e. affected the Byzantine Empire's ability to weather the storm of Arab-Islamic incursion c. 650 to 740. After the rupture of the eighth and ninth centuries, the subsequent recovery of the Byzantine Empire in the tenth century was followed c.1100 c.e. by a sudden downturn in rural agrarian activities, especially on the central Anatolian plateau and around its fringes. This dynamic, observable in the palaeoenvironmental as well as in the archaeological and historical data, reºects a complex interaction of natural factors with anthropogenic ones, including the arrival of the Selçuk Turks and of Türkmen nomads and their ºocks and herds in central and eastern Anatolia, concomitant with the abandonment of cereal production in much of these area.
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Regarding the following period, pollen evidence from some locations indicates a recovery during the later twelfth and early thirteenth century, a phenomenon that may well be associated with the gradual re-instatement of cereal production on a large scale as central Anatolia returned to political and economic stability. But the various categories of data do not always suggest the same conclusions, and the dating of climate change is generally imprecise. Moreover, the pollen record does not yet cover all of Anatolia, and many of the pollen datasets currently available can offer only a broad range of timing for changes in vegetation and land use. Such contradictions, inconsistencies, and inadequacies conªrm the importance of focusing on a speciªc region-scale analysis. This is not to suggest, however, that we can completely ignore the wider geographical perspective, either that of the Eastern Roman Empire or of the extensive area from the Middle East to the Atlantic. Indeed, we must always bear in mind the dialectic be-BYZANTINE CLIMATE | 151 44 For some preliminary approaches to this issue and related ones during the period, see Ellenblum, Collapse of the Eastern Mediterranean; for an assessment of how the Turks ªg-ured into the environmental history of Anatolia, see Izdebski, "Byzantine Ecologies," in M. Decker (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Byzantine Archaeology (New York, 2014) . tween events and circumstances throughout the duration of the Empire and transformations in the treatment and condition of the local environment. A comparison between how Byzantine society and the societies that preceded and followed it responded to climatic and environmental challenges can bring signiªcant insight, provided that reliable proxy data are available. For example, recent archaeological work on the the 4.2 ka bp Early Bronze Age "collapse" suggests that communities did not handle the same drought in the same way. The settlement at Tell Leilan appears to have been abandoned, whereas that at Tell Mozan continued. The crucial question in this case, as in the case of Anatolia from the seventh to the ninth-century c.e., is precisely why some communities were more resilient-or less "brittle," to use Wilkinson's term-than others.
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The upshot is that integrated regional and chronological synthesis, in the context of a broader picture, is an excellent platform on which historians, archaeologists, and environmental scientists can work together to interrogate evidence of causal and explanatory relationships for long-term socio-environmental change.
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